Jonathan R. Siegel
Professor of Law
George Washington University |
Publications |
The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation |
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84 Tex. L. Rev. 339 (2005) |
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Abstract |
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Can a single term in a single statutory provision ever have different meanings in different cases? In Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716 (2005), the Supreme Court said that that could never happen -- that such an interpretive approach would be “novel” and “dangerous.” The Court is wrong on both counts. Numerous cases, this article shows, have applied the “polymorphic principle” that a single phrase in a single statutory provision may have multiple meanings. Not only is the practice not dangerous, it fits well with standard interpretive principles. Martinez, the article suggests, represents a part of Justice Scalia's long-term campaign to limit judicial choice. The article attempts to show that a mechanical view of the judicial role is inappropriate. Courts should continue to exercise their appropriate role of making judicious choices in statutory interpretation, a role that will involve continued use of the polymorphic principle in appropriate cases. |