Symmetries

I comment on Richard Fallon's article, Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within Both, 99 Corn. L. Rev. 685 (2014). I agree with Fallon's observation that some degree of normative value judgment is an inevitable part of the interpretive process, even for textualists. I explain, however, that there remains a core distinction between textualism and other methods that causes textualism to become progressively radicalized, as I previously explained in The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism.


Symmetries—and Asymmetries—Between Theories of Statutory Interpretation
99 Corn. L. Rev. Online 182 (2014)

Abstract
	I comment on Richard Fallon's article, Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within Both, 99 Corn. L. Rev. 685 (2014). I agree with Fallon's observation that some degree of normative value judgment is an inevitable part of the interpretive process, even for textualists. I explain, however, that there remains a core distinction between textualism and other methods that causes textualism to become progressively radicalized, as I previously explained in The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism.