Jonathan R. Siegel
Professor of Law
George Washington University |
Publications |
The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference |
||
71 Vand. L. Rev. 937 (2018) |
||
Abstract |
Prominent figures in the legal world have recently
attacked the doctrine of Chevron deference, suggesting that
Chevron is unconstitutional because it interferes with a court’s
duty to exercise “independent judgment” when interpreting statutes.
This Article shows that Chevron’s critics are mistaken. Chevron
deference, properly understood, does not prevent courts from interpreting
statutes. An interpretation that concludes that a statute delegates
power to an executive agency is still an interpretation. The power implicitly
delegated to an agency by an ambiguous statute is not the power to interpret
the statute, but the power to make a policy choice within the limits
set by the possible meanings of the statute. |